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MULTISTATE TAXATION OF THE
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
GEORGE D. BRABSON*
In a highly urbanized society that has grown up over a geographical
area reaching out over more than sixty degrees of longitude, and covering
the boundary lines of forty-eight sovereign states, each with its sovereign
legislative body-it was inevitable that the conflicts of law under the
commerce clause of the Constitution would strike with peculiar force at
the transportation industry. The United States is a vast network of rail-
ways and highways connecting these urban manufacturing and consuming
centers, and undoubtedly owes much of its economic strength and prog-
ress to the development of this interstate transportation system.
In similar sequence it was just as inevitable that the difficulties in-
herent in the taxation of such a complex system of commerce should have
specific and peculiar application to the transportation industry. If we
examine the record of the problems of taxation of interstate commerce
from as far back as Re: The Daniel Ball,' and continue our examination
up to Railway Express Agency v. Virginia,2 the decisions of the courts
bear heavily on the transportation industry.
It cannot be said that the general doctrine of immunity as to the
transportation industry was developed independently of other industries
or of other commerce between the states. As a matter of fact much of
that doctrine was developed through the operations of other types of
industry and commerce in which the instrumentalities of interstate trans-
portation were only incidentally involved. On the other hand, it can
be said that the doctrine of immunity has been more strictly and rigidly
applied to the transportation industry where the actual tools and instru-
mentalities of carriers have been involved than to any other type of tax-
payer. And that doctrine as it applies to the properties of carriers goes
back as far historically as in the case of any other industry.
From the beginning of our constitutional system it seems to have
been recognized by the Federal courts at least that the actual or physical
movement of commerce across state boundaries cannot be burdened
with any sort of tax.' On the other hand, the Supreme Court
held in Coe v. Errol, cited above, that there was nothing whatever in
the Federal Constitution to prevent a city from taxing the goods of com-
merce gathered together and brought into the city for the purpose of an
interstate shipment. In that case Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court,
held flatly that goods and merchandise do not cease to be a part of the
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1The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. (Wall) 557 (1862).
2 Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 357 (1955).
3 See Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886), where the cases are reviewed.
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
general mass of property in a state subject to its jurisdiction and taxation
until they have been shipped or delivered to a carrier for transportation
to another state, or have been started on such transportation in a con-
tinuous route or journey.
In the still earlier case of The Daniel Ball, cited above, the Supreme
Court said:
Until actually launched on its way to another state,
or committed to a common carrier for transportation to such
state, its destination is not fixed and certain. It may be sold
or otherwise disposed of within the state, and never put in
course of transportation out of the state. Carrying it from the
farm or forest to the depot is only an interior movement of the
property, entirely within the state, for the purpose it is true,
but only for the purpose of putting it into a course of exporta-
tion; it is no part of the exportation itself.
* These two early decisions of the Supreme Court seemed to have
charted a course for the conduct of common carriers, and laid some
basis at least for the states to follow in determining when and under
what conditions the property, franchises and income of the carrier itself
were engaged in interstate commerce. For a good many years this ap-
peared to be the case and the states were chary of attempting to tax the
instrumentalities of interstate transportation. This doctrine lasted just
about as long as the haloes around the heads of the big railroads lasted,
which is to-say until the state legislatures beheld these large and growing
corporations doing business in their midst. Then it was that the legislatures
began to question why the theory of interstate commerce should give im-
munity from state taxation, and to propose the imposition of taxes upon
these instrumentalities in a little different form or of a different variety.
Insofar as multistate transportation agencies are concerned, these
later forms of taxation have fallen into three broad categories, to-wit:
income or license taxes arising out of the gross or net income from busi-
ness done within a state; franchise and privilege taxes based upon the
privilege of doing business within the taxing state; and property taxes
imposed upon the property used in business within a state. To retrace the
historical development of each of these doctrines would require a long
analysis of many conflicting decisions and would serve no useful pur-
pose here. It will rather be the purpose of the author to briefly outline
the broad doctrine which has been developed in each of these three cate-
gories, and to indicate to what extent each such doctrine has been followed
or has been deviated from in the more important decisions that have fol-
lowed.
FRANCHISE AND BusINEss PRIVILEGE TAXES
The trend of the law in this field was forecast at an early date by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown, v. Maryland, and later
425 U. S. (Wheat.) 419 (1S27).
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in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.5 The doctrine in these
and other. cases decided in that period can be summarized somewhat as
follows:
1. Taxing power is inherent in the sovereign states of the Union
and remains in them until delegated;
2. The commerce clause is not a delegation of the power to tax,
but is rather a prohibition against the burdening of commerce
between the states by one or more states;
3. The states in their efforts to tax the business carried on between
states:
a. May not tax interstate commerce itself, or the privilege of
doing business in interstate commerce; to-wit, the franchises
or licenses of the taxpayers;
b. Must apportion taxes on gross or net income to that amount
attributable to intra-state commerce within such state;
c. Must not discriminate through taxation against interstate com-
merce, or directly burden such commerce.
One of the earlier cases where this doctrine was applied to the
transportation industry was in Norfolk and Western Railroad Company
v. Pennsylvania6, which involved a franchise tax on the right to do busi-
ness in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court held that the statute itself was
invalid as it applied to a railroad company which did not exercise any
privilege or franchise in Pennsylvania not connected with interstate
commerce or required for the purpose of such commerce.
In that case Justice Lamar, speaking for a divided Court, said this:
It is well settled by numerous decisions of this Court that a
state cannot, under the guise of a license tax, exclude from its
jurisdiction a foreign corporation engaged in interstate com-
merce, or impose any burdens upon such commerce within its
limits. Sorte of the cases sustaining this proposition are collected
in McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 391, and need not be
repeated here.
The Court then went on specifically as to a railroad carrier to hold
that the business of a through line of a railroad which consists of carry-
ing freight and passengers into and out of a state constitutes a part of
interstate commerce, and hence any one of the roads or branch lines
forming a part or link in the through line is engaged in interstate com-
merce, since the business of each one of the roads or links serves to in-
crease the volume of business done by the through line, citing The
Daniel Ball, and Wabash, St. Louis and Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany V. Illinois.
7
The same strict doctrine seems generally to have been followed in
later decisions of the Supreme Court, such as Lyng v. Michigan, Cheney
5 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
6 136 U. S. 114 (1890).
7 118 U. S. 557 (1886).
8 135 U. S. 161 (1890).
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Bros. v. Massachusetts9 and Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier."0 In
Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company,11 the
Supreme Court applied the rule to both transportation and communica-
tion facilities and overruled the right of the State of Montana to levy a
license tax on such instrumentalities. The Court said that while a state
may require payment of an occupation (business privilege) tax on a corp-
oration engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce, it cannot
levy a tax on interstate commerce itself or upon the business and instru-
mentalities which constitute interstate commerce, or the privilege of
engaging therein. The Court also said that the ability to tax the portion
which is intrastate does not justify a tax either upon the interstate part
of the business, or upon -the business as a whole without discrimination.
An oblique development of the doctrine appeared in Ozark Pipe
Line Co. v. Moider. 2 In that case, with Justice Brandeis dissenting,
Justice Sutherland held that notwithstanding local business activities such as
the maintenance of offices, telephone and telegraph lines, trucks and
cars, the purchase of supplies and employment of labor, all within the
State of Missouri, and all devoted to the operation of a through pipe line
system-the State of Missouri had no power to levy an annual franchise
tax on the capital stock of a foreign corporation operating that system,
since the operation of a through pipe line system originating in another
state, passing through Missouri, and entering into a third state constitutes
interstate commerce exclusively and cannot be taxed by any state.
In the still later case of Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc.
v. Stone'3 , the taxpayer operated a fleet of trucks which crossed into
Mississippi and Arkansas and picked up and delivered laundry to cus-
tomers in those states. The State of Mississippi sought to tax the business
done in that state by imposing a license tax on each driver soliciting busi-
ness in that state. The Supreme Court struck down the tax, saying:
In the long line of "drummer" cases, beginning with
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 1887, 120 U. S.
489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 694, this Court has held that
a tax imposed upon the solicitation of interstate business is a tax
upon interstate commerce itself. Whether or not solicitation of
interstate business may be regarded as a local incident of inter-
state commerce, the Court has not permitted state taxation to
carve out this incident from the integral economic process of
interestate commerce. As the Court noted last term in a case
involving door-to-door solicitation of interstate business, 'Inter-
state commerce itself knocks on the local door.'
On the other hand, there has been a flood of cases in fairly recent
years where the courts have sustained franchise and business privilege
9246 U. S. 147 (1918).
10266 U. S. 255 (1925).
11294 U. S. 384 (1935), 55 S. Ct. 477.
12 See Footnote 10, Supra.
13 342 U. S. 389, 393 (1952).
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taxes where the taxpayer was engaged in substantial local business activities
and -a substantial part of its business could be traced to those activities.
These cases include Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Dough-
ton, 4 Postal Telegraph Company v. City of Richmond, 5 and Eastern
Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,"6 which out-
line the exceptions to the general doctrine of immunity. In the Postal
Telegraph case the Court said:
A state may lawfully impose a license tax restricted . . .
to the right to do local business within its borders . . . where
the local business . . . is so substantial in amount that it does
not clearly appear that the tax is a disguised attempt to tax
interstate commerce.
In the Eastern Air Transport case the Supreme Court went so far as
to hold that a state has the power to lay a license tax on the sale or use
of property even though it forms part of the instrumentalities of com-
merce. The tax there was designated as a license for the privilege of
selling gasoline in that state. The Court said that whether the tax was an
excise on the privilege of selling gasoline or was a property tax on the
gasoline itself was immaterial. In either case the tax was validly imposed
upon a local activity, was non-discriminatory as to foreign taxpayers, and
constituted no burden on interstate commerce even though the taxpayer's
sole business was transportation of freight and passengers in such com-
merce.
In the case of Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone'17 , the
Supreme Court went the limit in upholding the right of a state to impose
a franchise tax on the transportation industry. In that case the gas com-
pany operated a natural gas transmission pipe line which ran through
a portion of Mississippi and ended in Tennessee. Two pump stations were
located in Mississippi and the company sold natural gas wholesale at several
points in that state. The state imposed a general franchise tax on all
corporations doing business in Mississippi based on the amount of capital
used, invested or employed in the state.
Both the Supreme Court of Mississippi and the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld this franchise tax fundamentally on the basis
of the local business activities on which the tax was based. In a divided
Court opinion the U. S. Supreme Court said that these local business
activities were, the basis for a franchise tax in controversy; that the tax-
payer operated local compressor stations and had other local activities.
Then the Court added:
The cases just cited . . . show that from the viewpoint
of the commerce clause where the corporations carry on a local
'4262 U. S. 413 (1923).
15249 U. S. 252 (1918).
16285 U. S. 147 (1932).
17335 U. S. 80 (1948).
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activity sufficiently separate from the interstate commerce state
taxes may be validly laid.
One of the more recent developments of this doctrine as it affects
the transportation industry is, of course, the case of Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor'8, decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in
1951. In that case a Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in the
operation of a number of trucks in interstate commerce and maintaining
a series of pickup stations in various states, was called upon to pay a
Connecticut license tax for the right to operate its trucks in that state,
measured by the net income derived therefrom. The Supreme Court re-
jected various arguments as to the nature of the tax as an income tax.
It held that since the tax was imposed on the corporation's right to do
business in Connecticut it was in effect a tax on the business itself, and
since that was exclusively interstate in character, the tax was in violation
of the commerce clause and therefore invalid.
The Spector Motor Serze case has aroused more interest and com-
ment than any case decided in this area for many years. One of the
principal reasons for this is that the case seemed to put a quietus on any
further extension of the so-called "local activities" rule, and to fore-
shadow a return by the Court to the general doctrine of immunity
found in the earlier decisions of the Court. Another reason for this
unusual interest and comment lies in the fact that many tax men are
unable to reconcile some of the language in the Spector case to what was
actually decided in that case.19 The Court makes the broad statement
that a state is not precluded from imposing taxes upon activities or
aspects of interstate commerce which are subject to the sovereign power
of the state, and that it is only necessary that the tax burden be related
in some way to the sovereign powers of the state, and that the tax be non-
discriminatory. Notwithstanding that doctrine the Court held invalid a
tax which was clearly related to the general sovereign powers of all the
states, and which the Court specifically held to be a non-discriminatory
tax. The basis for the Court's decision lies in the fact that the taxpayer's
business was exclusively in interstate commerce, and hence was not sub-
ject to state taxation no matter how fairly the tax could be apportioned.
It is, of course, difficult to reconcile the Spector case with Memphis Na-
tural Gas Company v. Stone, supra, where in dealing with a similar tax
under almost identical conditions the Court reached a different con-
clusion. 
2
We now come to Railway Express Agency v. Virginia,2 which is
one of the last decisions of the Supreme Court in this area of franchise
lSSpector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602, (1950).
19 Cox, The State's Po'wer and Constitutional Limitations to Tax, TAXES,
The Tax Magazine, November, 1952, p. 910.
20 Drazen, Recent Trends in State Taxation, TAXES, The Tax Maga-
zine, April, 1956, p. 286.
21347 U. S. 359 (1954).
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taxation, and which Mr. Justice Jackson characterized as "another varia-
tion, in the endless problems raised by efforts of the several states to tax
commerce as it moves among them." In that case the taxpayer, a Dela-
ware corporation, was prohibited by Virginia laws from doing any public
service -business in Virginia except that done in interstate commerce.
Nevertheless it had many offices in that state, owned real property, motor
vehicles, etc., and carried on a general express business in the state
operating largely through a Virginia subsidiary. The state attempted to
impose its general tax on gross receipts to taxpayer applicable to all ex-
press companies. The taxpayer continued with the contention that since
its business in Virginia was entirely interstate, the state could not impose
a license tax in any form for engaging in that business.
The Supreme C6urt of Virginia2 2 upheld the tax on the ground
that it was (in spite of its designation) a tax on property, i.e. a tax on
the intangible property value of the good will of the business, and hence
as property employed in Virginia it was subject to tax by the state. The
U. S. Supreme Court rejected this argument as factitious, and held that
it was in reality a license tax based on the privilege of engaging in the
express business, and since the taxpayer was engaged only in interstate
business in Virginia, the tax was a burden on such commerce and invalid.
In the light of these decisions which are believed to reflect the
varied points of view of many state and inferior Federal Courts, the
trend of the doctrine of immunity as it applies to the transportation in-
dustry may be summarized along these lines:
1. All the states have inherently the sovereign power
to tax the franchises and privileges that come within their
jurisdiction;
2. Wherever a foreign transportation agency uses or
exercises franchises and privileges confined to the field of inter-
state commerce, which do not grow out of local business ac-
tivities related to such commerce, the states may not burden
interstate commerce 'by taxing such franchises or privileges;
3. On the other hand, to the extent that a foreign trans-
portation agency engages in or draws upon local business ac-
tivities not in and of themselves a part of or related to inter-
state commerce, the franchise or privilege of transporting
such business may be taxed by the state, provided a fair ap-
portionment of the tax is made between local transportation
business and interstate transportation business.
3
STATE INCOME TAxEs
Sufficient has already been said under the subject of Franchise and
Privilege Taxes to avoid a repetition of the historical growth of the
general doctrine of immunity as applied to transportation agencies. In
22 194 Va. 757, 75 S. E. 2nd 61. (1953).
23 See the discussion of this problem as it relates to interstate commerce
generally in U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
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fact it can be said that the modern trend in the area of state income
taxes began with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of U. S. Glue Company v. Oak Creek,2 4 cited above. That case
imposed an income tax based upon net income from all sources within
the State of Wisconsin upon all corporations engaged in business in that
state, and measured the tax by the net income derived both from inter-
state and intrastate business.
The Supreme Court held that while a state may not directly burden
interstate commerce by levying a tax on such commerce, it may impose a
tax which only "indirectly affects" the income or profits from such
commerce. The Court then went on to say that a tax on gross receipts
would be a direct tax on such commerce and hence invalid, but that a
net income tax was "manifestly and substantially" different, and that
this difference "affords a convenient and workable basis of distinction
betveen a direct burden upon the business affected, and a charge that is
only indirect and incidental."
This new doctrine was, of course, at variance with the long-
established and long-adhered to doctrine of virtual immunity which the
agencies and instrumentalities actually engaged in transporting interstate
commerce had always enjoyed. This principle of immunity had been
followed by all the Federal Courts since the case of Leloup v. Port of
Mobile" was decided in 1888. In that case the Court stated the principle
of immunity as follows:
No state has the right to lay a tax on interstate com-
merce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the trans-
portation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts
derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or
business of carrying it on, and the reason is that
such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a
regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.
A very serious question can be raised on the sheer economics of the
decision in the Oak Creek case. It may be recalled that just prior to the
time that case was decided in 1918 the Federal Income Tax rate was only
2% on corporations and the Wisconsin tax in question was 2%. With the
present Federal rate on corporations at 52% and no apparent constitu-
tional limit on the Wisconsin tax rate, it seems doubtful if any court
could any longer dismiss such taxes as only an "incidental" burden on
interstate commerce, regardless of the fact that it was imposed in the
form of a net income tax rather than a levy on gross income.
24247 U. S. 321 (1918).
25 127 U. S. 640 (1888). But see State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts,
82 U. S. 284 (1872), where the Supreme Court sustained a Pennsylvania tax on
the gross receipts from freight charges received from goods transported in inter-
state commerce. The Court avoided the constitutional question by holding that
merchandise shipped in interstate commerce ceased to be immume from state
taxation after it became intermingled with the other properties of the carrier
in the taxing state; hence may be the subject of a gross receipts tax.
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Be that as it may, the Oak C'reek case is cited in this connection
primarily because it represents such a distinct departure from prior de-
cisions of the Court, and also because it cites a case involving the trans-
portation industry in its support. This case was St. Lours and South-
western Railway v. Arkansas,28 decided in 1912. But that was a case
involving property taxes which the State of Arkansas sought to impose
on an interstate railroad running through the state and owning real and
personal property at various places in the state. The Court upheld such
taxes on the ground that the property was located in the State and used
in that State, as part of the mass of property of all its citizens.
In this connection it should be noted that while there were a number
of cases which followed the Oak Creek case27 and seemed to be ex-
panding that rule to cover almost any conceivable situation, the Supreme
Court did not hold in any of them that this doctrine could be applied
in the absence of some evidence at least of intrastate business. There is
some dicta even by the Supreme Court in those cases, but in none of
them was the Court actually called upon to decide that issue where there
was no intrastate business done by the taxpayer. It should also be noted
that none of these cases involved taxpayers engaged in the transportation
industry itself. The development of the doctrine of upholding taxes
based upon net income as constituting only an indirect or incidental
burden came about largely through cases involving other industries.
Shortly after the Oak Creek decision and while it was still regarded
as a curious case, the Supreme Court decided Shaffer v. Carter,2" which
involved both a producer and transporter of crude oil. Shaffer, a resident
of Illinois, produced oil in Oklahoma and transported it for sale outside
that state. Oklahoma sought to impose its income tax upon the income
derived from sales negotiated in Oklahoma but shipped elsewhere. The
Supreme Court charted a new course around the commerce clause by
saying that merely because merchandise is used in interstate commerce or
the products shipped in or out of a state does not create an immunity to a
tax on the income derived from such transactions. Said the Court:
. . . just as a state may impose general income taxes upon its
own citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its con-
trol, it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like
character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes
accruing to nonresidents from their property or business with-
in the state, or their occupations carried on therein; enforcing
payment so far as it can, by the exercise of a just control over
persons and property within its borders.
The gist of this decision is, of course, that in order to be taxable
26235 U. S. 350 (1912).
27 See Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1937) and
cases cited there in.
28252 U. S. 37 (1920).
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the income must be derived from property in or business done within
the taxing state or the state must have jurisdiction over the person being
taxed. Within a few years these propositions had become almost common-
place, so that the case of Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue"9
cited above, did not excite great attention although it threw a new
angle into the picture.
In the Western Livestock case a magazine publisher prepared,
printed and distributed advertising material largely through the mails. It
sold advertising space to customers in every state. All the physical work
of preparing the copy, printing it and shipping it took place in New
Mexico, although the materials themselves went to out-of-state pur-
chasers. New Mexico imposed an income tax on the revenue derived
from the sale of advertising space.
The Supreme Court ignored several cases holding that the local
activities connected with interstate commerce may become a part of the
process of generating and increasing such commerce, and proceeded to
hold contrarywise that the physical acts of preparing, printing and dis-
tributing the printed matter were controlling, and that these constituted
local business activities of sufficient consequence upon which the State
could base its income tax. Inferentially the Court held that an income
tax upon the income of such a taxpayer could only be regarded as an
"indirect burden" on interstate commerce, even though all the taxpayer's
income came from without New Mexico.
The case which really gave a twist to this new doctrine of "indirect
and hence taxable" burden in the area of income taxation was the case
of West Publishng Company 'v. McColgan. ° In that instance the tax-
payer, a Minnesota corporation, was engaged in selling lawbooks through-
out the United States. In California it maintained no offices or ware-
houses, solicited orders exclusively through "agents and employees" who
were in reality solicitors having space in lawyers' offices, and all its books
-and magazines were shipped into California from warehouses located
outside the State. Taxpayer claimed it was exempt from the Cali-
fornia Corporation Income Tax because it was engaged entirely in
interstate commerce and had no income derived from intrastate com-
merce in California. The State contended first that the taxpayer was
carrying on sufficient local business activity to generate income from
California sources, and second that even if the taxpayer's business was
wholly interstate in character it was still liable to the California tax, be-
cause that tax was an indirect tax on income which was subject to such
a tax regardless of its character.
The Supreme Court of California obviously decided the case on
the first issue, since it held that the solicitation and other activities of
29303 U. S. 250 (1937).
30 328 U. S. 825 (1946), affirming 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P. 2d 861, and citing
Oak Creek, subra note 23, and Memphis Natural Gas Company cases, supra note 17,
and Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodget, 276 U. S. 245. (1927).
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the taxpayer's agents and employees in California constituted "substantial
income-producing activities," and that based upon these benefits and pro-
tection of taxpayer's business the State could validly impose an income
tax. However, the Court went further and accepted the second argument
in toto, citing the Memphis Natural Gas Company, the Oak Creek and
Atlantic Coast Line cases, supra, as well as McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Company1 and similar cases in the Federal Courts
as its authority. It stated in passing that there is a difference between a
tax whose subject is the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce,
and a tax whose subject is the net income from such commerce. It further
stated as one of its basic conclusions that a state "may tax that income
from operations in interstate commerce, although a tax on the commerce
itself is forbidden." It then ended up with a final pronouncement that
"a tax may be levied by a state on net income wholly derived from inter-
state commerce." It cited the Berwind-White case in support of that
conclusion.
Unfortunately the Beruwnd-White case did not hold that at all.
There is some dicta in the Berwind-White case to that effect, but the
Court did not have that issue before it and hence could not decide it. All
that was decided there was that the New York City sales tax was cond-
ditioned on a local activity which was subject to the taxing power of the
city, to-wit, that the making of contracts in the City followed by delivery
of the coal under such contracts was doing business in the city, and was
sufficient to subject such sales to the city tax.
Actually, one of the first cases of the Supreme Court to decide with-
out reservation that taxation of the net income of an interstate carrier
does not violate the commerce clause seems to have been Atlantic Coast
Line v. DoughtonW2 in 1922. The Court had argued to the contrary only
a year previously in Pullman Co. v. Richardson,3" a case which involved,
however, a tax on gross receipts. In the Atkantic Coast Line case the State
of North Carolina imposed a net income tax on all interstate carriers,
basing the tax on the net income reported to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The Supreme Court upheld the tax, basing its decision
squarely on the fact that the tax was not a direct burden because it was
imposed only on the net income, and on the fact that the taxing statute
applied to all carriers in the state and did not discriminate against inter-
state commerce.
In the Matson NazAgation Company case,3 4 the Supreme Court went
a little further along this general line and held that a state may tax the
net income of one of its own corporations engaged in the transportation
industry, even though it included all the income derived from interstate
and foreign business transactions. The Court also held, however, that a
31309 U. S. 33. (1939).
32 Atlantic Coast Line v. Doughton, 262 U. S. 413 (1922).
3 3 Puliman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 (1921).
34 297 U. S. 441 (1936).
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foreign corporation whose sole business within the state was interstate
and foreign in character, could not be taxed for the privilege of doing
such business in the state even though the tax is measured by the net in-
come from interstate or foreign business done in that state.
In Yazoo and Mississipf i Valley Railroad Co. v. Board of Com-
mnssioners,35 the Supreme Court simply affirmed a decision of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, citing the 4Ilantic Coast Line case as its authority.
The Mississippi Court had held that a tax imposed upon an interstate
carrier by a local levee district was not invalid because it imposed a greater
burden on the carrier for the privilege of operating in Mississippi than
was imposed on other kinds of taxpayers. The tax was measured by resort
to a formula which placed the privilege of operating a railroad on a
mileage basis, and levied the tax at a specified amount per mile of classi-
fied track.
Mr. Justice Cardozo settled the doctrine employing the use of a
formula to impose a net income tax on interstate carriers, at least for the
time being, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. North Carolina,3 6
decided in 1936. In that case North Carolina imposed under a special
statute an income tax upon the net income of interstate railroads, and
set up a statutory formula. The formula started with gross income from
revenues derived in North Carolina, including the equal mileage pro-
portion within the state of the carrier's interstate business, and deducting
therefrom the proportionate average of its operating expenses to its entire
expenses. The Supreme Court held two things: (1) that mileage in a
state may have a relation to a tax on net income, which it may not bear to
a tax on property or on a franchise; and (2) that a division of the
revenues and expenses of an interstate carrier which carries on a unitary
business can only be done with a fair degree of reasonableness, and the
use of a formula to do so is not invalid. Justice Cardozo accepted without
question or argument the principle that such a carrier may be taxed on its
net income even though it is engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.
Shortly thereafter in Great Northern Railway Co. v. State of
Washington 7 the Supreme Court had before it the question whether a
state may impose a tax on the gross income of an interstate carrier, under
the theory that such a tax was required for supervision and regulation of
the local structures and operations of such a carrier. The Court upheld the
right of a state in principle to impose such a tax, provided it was fair and
reasonable. The Court held, however, that where such a tax is imposed
under a formula or in a manner so disproportionate to the service rendered
as to become an unreasonable exaction it cannot be sustained as an in-
direct burden on interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented on two grounds: (1) that the tax
35311 U. S. 607 (1940).
36297 U. S. 682 (1936).
37 300 U. S. 154 (1937).
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in question was in the final analysis based upon a percentage of the gross
revenues from intrastate commerce; and (2) that the burden of proof
to show that the burden of the tax was disproportionate and unreasonable
should have rested upon the taxpayer, rather than to require the state
to prove otherwise. This rule of evidence in such cases was promptly
picked up by the Supreme Court in Bourjos, Inc. v. Chapman,as which
held squarely that the party challenging legislation which only indirectly
affects interstate commerce must assume the burden of proof of any
"undue burden" on such commerce.
One of the last touches given to the doctrine of "indirect burden"
on income derived by a carrier from interstate commerce is found in
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey.s9 In that case the State of New
York sought to impose a tax on the gross receipts of a bus line which ran
from Buffalo to New York County but passed en route through portions
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The movement was one which the
Court held to be exclusively interstate in character, and hence, said the
Supreme Court, the State of New York could not impose a tax measured
by "the entire gross receipts" of the taxpayer. However, the Court added
by way of dictum that it saw no such problem if such a tax could have
been levied by all three states and apportioned between them on some rea-
sonable -basis. The inference seems clear that even one state may impose
such a tax if it confines its tax burden to the proceeds which arise out of
intrastate movements.
However, in a more recent case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
having before it the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the Spector
case, supra, showed considerable signs of backing away from the "indirect
and incidental burden" doctrine. In the case of Roy Stone Transfer Co. v.
Messner4" the State of Pennsylvania had sought to impose its corporation
income tax of 1951 upon the net income of the taxpayer under the guise
of a "property tax on net income derived from sources within this
Commonwealth." The Supreme Court, reversing the lower Court, held:
(1) that in spite of its statutory designation the tax in question was a tax
on net income; (2) that where an interstate carrier has no real property
in a state and carries on no local business solicitation it is engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce; and (3) that the mere pick-up and delivery of
passengers or merchandise in a state as part of a general interstate move-
ment cannot be classified as intrastate commerce, and hence cannot be
made the basis of any tax on net income from such commerce.
By way of contrast the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Wieman
and Ward Co. v. Pittsburgh, decided in 1955, held that the sale of coal
in Pittsburgh by local dealers was sufficient local business activity to subject
such sales to the Pittsburgh mercantile license tax (based on income),
38301 U. S. 183 (1937).
39334 U. S. 653 (1948).
40 377 Pa. 234, 103 At. 2d 700 (1954).
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although all of the coal was brought in from other states and shipped
in by river barges belonging in certain cases to the vendors. The Court
said that mere delivery into the city was a local business activity sufficient
to support the tax.4 '
The Supreme Court of Georgia has quite recently accepted a strict
construction of the doctrine of local business activity in Redwine v. Re-
frigerated Transport Corporation.42 In that case taxpayer's railroad cars
were leased to various interstate railroads for use over their systems.
These cars were used to transport refrigerated goods into and out of
Georgia and were actually used to give service to local shippers and cus-
tomers in that state. The Court held two things: first that the taxpayer had
no offices in Georgia and was not engaged in soliciting business in that
state; and second that since the taxpayer had no local activities in Georgia
that state could not impose its income tax on the business taxpayer did
do in Georgia, that being all interstate in character.
In Virginia a recent decision in Zrlington v. .4rcade-Sunshine Co.
43
involved transportation facilities belonging to the taxpayer and used to
pick up and deliver laundry in that state, taxpayer having its plant in the
District of Columbia. The County of Arlington sought to impose its
business license tax based on income derived from business done. The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that as to "pick-ups" the tax was not ap-
plicable since they were "part of the flow of interstate commerce." On
the other hand the Court held that the maintenance of pickup stations in
Virginia was different and constituted a local business activity sufficient to
base the tax upon it aad the taxpayer.
It is, of course, extremely different to reconcile the two aspects of
the Arcade-Sunshine case in and of themselves, to say nothing of the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Spector case, cited above. In the
Spector case the taxpayer maintained exactly the same sort of local
facilities for the pickup of merchandise which, upon being loaded into
taxpayer's trucks, entered into and became "part of the flow of inter-
state commerce" just as surely as did the pickups in the Arcade-Sunshine
case.
In summary of the many aspects of income taxation of interstate
transportation agencies and instrumentalities, and taking into account the
many variations in the so-called "indirect and incidental burden" theory,
it is believed that the present status may be outlined as follows:
1. That in its broad and general application no state tax
on income can discriminate against intrastate commerce, or
impose an undue or unreasonable burden on such commerce.44
2. That no such tax can be imposed upon the gross receipts
or gross income of an interstate transportation agency without
41381 Pa. 533 (1955).
42 Redwine v. Refrigerated Transport Corp., 90 Ga. App. 784 (1955).
43 196 Va. 916 (1955).
44 Gwin, White and Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1938).
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the use of some formula or device for equitable apportionment,
so that such a tax will bear only on the receipts from business
done within that state.45
3. That no such tax may be predicated upon a taxable
event which is subject to similar taxation by another state, since
to permit such taxation would subject the taxpayer to multiple
taxation of the same income derived from interstate com-
merce.
46
PROPERTY TAXES ON INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
FACILITIES
In the field of property taxes imposed by a state on interstate carriers
and transportation agencies the decisions in the state courts are in-
numerable, and in many instances are irreconcilable. The underlying
question in most such cases is whether or not the nature and use of the
property is such as to confer a tax situs suficient in character or duration
upon which the tax can be laid. This depends, of course, upon the kind
of property sought to be taxed, and perhaps to an even greater extent
upon the nature of the tax that is involved.
The cases in the Federal Courts have managed to adhere more
consistently to the basic doctrine outlining what constitutes a tax situs for
the imposition of the particular tax in question, as well as to the principle
of uniformity which accompanies it. In the early federal cases the courts
were concerned primarily with whether or not the property was within
the jurisdiction of the state on the date of the assessment, and
was in the ownership and possession of the taxpayer at that moment of
time, regardless of any other time element. Where the property was per-
sonal property moving in interstate commerce at the date of assessment
the general trend was to exempt such property from ad valorem taxation
by a state. A temporary pause or resting of the property within a state
other than for purposes of use, storage or consumption within the state did
not destroy the continuity of interstate movement or subject such property
to tax in that state. 47
In the Champlain Realty Co. case, cited above, Chief Justice Taft
remarked that the commerce clause does not give immunity to moveable
property from local taxation which is nondiscriminatory unless the prop-
erty is in actual continuous transit. He then went on to say that most
of the doubts arise when there are interruptions in the transit and when
the property is still in possession or control of the owner during such
transit. In that instance the Court held that the holding of logs in a
45 See also Braniff Airways v .Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S. 590 (1954).
46 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
47 Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922) ; St. Louis &
Southwestern Railway v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 (1914); Adams Express Co.
v. State Auditor (Ohio), 165 U. S. 194 (1897); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana
Pipeline Co., 303 U. S. 604 (1938).
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boom at one location for several days for safety purposes did not destroy
their immunity from local taxation.
In the somewhat similar case of Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minne-
sota, 48 the same Court and same Justice held that pulpwood sold for intra-
state shipment to the purchasers in other states, and floated by the taxpayer
down a river in Minnesota to a Great Lakes port for further shipment
by boat across Lake Superior, constituted a continuous movement in
interstate commerce, and the State of Minnesota could not impose an ad
valorem tax on it at any stage of such movement. The fact that the logs
came to rest in the state was wholly immaterial, said the Court, as long
as they were still in the process of delivery from seller to buyer.
In Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vir 9 the same Court, again speaking
through Chief Justice Taft, held that crude oil produced in the Mid-
continent fields, transported by pipe line and railroad into Louisiana and
stored there, awaiting shipment or for accumulation of sufficient cargo
for ultimate transportation to foreign countries, was not subject to ad
valorem tax by Louisiana, since the storage there was an inherent part
of a continuous movement in interstate and foreign commerce. The
Court again stressed the fact that merely coming to rest within the con-
fines of a state does not of itself confer a taxing situs, as long as the
property is actually engaged in an interstate movement of commerce.
Up until this point in 1929 it is quite obvious that the Supreme
Court, without dissent, simply assumed that the immunity of such property
from state tax burdens was to be determined on the basis of strict con-
stitutional law, and that the Court did not need to concern itself with
the economics of such a case, nor with the then impending shadow of the
depression years and the urgent need of the states for revenue. These
ulterior considerations did not come into the picture until a few years
later when the states had begun to impose various kinds of temporary
and emergency taxes to tide them over the depression. It should also be
noted that up until this time the courts in general had not drawn a very
clear distinction between property which was the subject of interstate com-
merce, and the instrumentalities and facilities of commerce themselves.
One of the earliest of such cases, which has been followed generally
by most of the state courts, and which can be regarded as having initiated
a broader pattern for the ad valorem taxation of property engaged in
interstate transportation was the case of Nas/wille, Chattanooga and St.
Louis Railway Co. v. Wallace5 There the doctrine was clearly extended
to cover the property of a common carrier engaged primarily in inter-
state transportation. In that case a property tax laid by the State of
Tennessee on the storage of gasoline in the State was sustained regardless
of the fact that it was used directly in the operation of taxpayer's trains in
48272 U. S. 469 (1926).
49279 U. S. 95 (1929).
50288 U. S. 249 (1933).
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interstate commerce. The Court said that where the power to tax property
exists it includes the power to tax all the constituent elements of the prop-
erty; that the taxable element in this case was the storage of property
within the state; and that it was not prohibited by the commerce clause
because the tax was not imposed until after the movement in interstate
commerce had ceased, and the gasoline had become a part of the mass
of property within the state.
While each of the foregoing cases involved a taxpayer engaged in
part at least in the transportation industry, the case of Southern Pacfic
Co. v. Gallagher,5 involved a taxpayer engaged wholly in interstate
transportation and instrumentalities used in such commerce. In that case
the taxpayer purchased certain equipment from various vendors in a num-
ber of states which was shipped into California for storage and use by
the taxpayer in carrying on its business as a common carrier. The State
of California sought to impose its use tax upon such property effective
upon termination of the transportation movement.
The Supreme Court stated the broad doctrine that a state tax on
interstate commerce or consumption in such commerce was invalid, but
proceeded to modify the rule by holding that the invalidity of such a
tax on the use of property arises from a levy on commerce itself or on its
gross receipts, but not on events prior to the movement in commerce or
subsequent thereto. The Court then sustained the California tax on the
ground that it was imposed on an event occurring after commerce ceased,
to wit, the use of the property and exercise of property rights therein by
the taxpayer in the State of California, and as one of the incidents of
ownership.
The general doctrine of immunity afforded under the commerce
clause as it applied to the property of carriers and other transportation
agencies can be summarized at this point briefly as follows:
1. Property of a carrier constituting a part of the facili-
ties and instrumentalities of transportation in interstate com-
merce may be the subject of a tax by the various states, pro-
vided it is a property tax levied only upon property having
a taxing situs within that state.r2
2. The taxing situs of personal property moving in inter-
state commerce as part of the instrumentalities of transporta-
tion depends upon the nature and extent of its use and employ-
ment within the taxing state.
3. Such a tax must be fairly and equitably apportioned
on the basis of its use and employment within the taxing state.
Such were the broad outlines of the doctrine of immunity as it
affected the property of interstate carriers themselves up until the advent
51306 U. S. 167 (1939).
52 See the U. S. Supreme Court cases starting with Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U. S. 530 (1888), and running to Juget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 90 (1937).
[Vol. 18
TRANSPORTA1TION INDUSTRY
of the airplane into the field of interstate transportation. The coming of
air transportation has introduced so many new elements into the picture
that Justice Frankfurter referred to the problem in the Braniff Airways
case"s in the following language:
Until Congress acts, the vital thing for the Court in this
new and subtle field is to focus on the process of interstate
commerce and protect it from inroads of taxation by a State
beyond 'opportunities which it has given, . ..protection which
it has afforded, . . . benefits which it has conferred by the fact
of being an orderly, civilized society (Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Company)'.
In the Braniff case the State of Nebraska imposed an ad valorem
personal property tax on the planes and flight equipment used by taxpayer
in conducting a purely inteirstate airlines business. The Supreme Court
held that the tax was not invalid, and could be imposed under a formula
allocating a percentage of taxpayer's equipment to Nebraska, based on
the ratio which the landings, revenue tons carried, and originating
revenues in Nebraska bore to the total of such factors in taxpayer's over-
all operations.
Mr. Justice Reed outlined the historical basis for the ruling, and
based it upon the following premises:
(1) That the commerce clause does not give immunity
to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce from certain
forms of state taxation, and such commerce may be required
to pay its share of a nondiscriminatory tax burden.54
(2) That there is no difference in principle between the
power of a state to tax river boats sailing in interstate-commerce
and aircraft flying in such commerce.55
(3) That the taxable situs of movable personal property
does not depend upon absolute permanency, but "upon the habi-
tual employment of the property within the state." '56
(4) That the maintenance of rented offices, space and
hangars in Nebraska, coupled with eighteen landings per day,
constituted the "habitual employment of the property within
the state" necessary to sustain the tax.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, sustained the validity
of the formula used in the Braniff case on the following grounds:
My understanding of our decisions is that the power to
lay an ad valorem tax turns on the permanency of the property
in the State. All the property may be there or only a fraction
of it. Property in transit, whether a plane discharging passengers
or an automobile refueling, is not subject to an ad valorem
tax. Property in transit may move so regularly and so con-
53 Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U. S. 590 (1949).
54 Citing Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1937) and
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157 (1953).
55 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382 (1952).
5 6 Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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tinuously that part of it is always in the State. Then the fraction,
but no more, may be taxed ad valorem.
It seems clear that the decision in the Braniff case carried the
Supreme Court's doctrine of habitual employment of property even
farther than it was announced in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota.5 7
The facts in that case were somewhat similar to the Braniff case except
that Northwest was a Minnesota corporation with its principal offices in
Minnesota and none of its property was permanently located elsewhere.
The Supreme Court held that Minnesota could levy an ad valorem tax
on the entire fleet of planes and flight equipment used in interstate com-
merce, and (as the Court pointed out in the Braniff case) the decision
was based largely on the fact that the taxpayer had no property per-
manently located in any other states.
On this point the language of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Supreme Court, is interesting:
Minnesota is here taxing a corporation for all its property
within the State during the tax year no part of which receives
permanent protection from any other State. The benefits given
to Northwest by Minnesota and for which Minnesota taxes-its
corporate facilities and the governmental resources which
Northwest enjoys in the conduct of its -business in Minnesota-
are concretely symbolized by the fact that Northwest's principal
place of business is in St. Paul and that St. Paul is the 'home
port' of all its planes. The relation between Northwest and
Minnesota--a relation existing between no other State and
Northwest-and the benefits which this relation affords
are the constitutional foundation for the taxing power which
Minnesota has asserted. See State Tax Com. v. Aldrich, 316
U. S. 174, 180, 62 S. Ct. 1008 ,1011, 86 L. Ed. 1358, 139
A.L.R. 1436. i4o other State can claim to tax as the State of
the legal domicle as well as the home State of the fleet, as
a business fact. No other State is the State which gave North-
west the power to be as well as the power to function as North-
west functions in Minnesota; no other State could impose a tax
that derives from the significant legal relation of creator and
creature and the practical consequences of that relation in this
case. On the basis of rights which Minnesota alone originated
and Minnesota continues to safeguard, she alone can tax the per-
sonalty which is permanently attributable to Minnesota and
to no other State. It is too late to suggest that this taxing power
of a State is less because the tax may be reflected in the cost of
transportation.
The significance of these two cases lies in the fact that the Court
recognized the principle of the habitual employment of property as creat-
ing a situs for tax purposes, and then extended the principle so as to permit
more than one state to use the same method of taxation, provided the
5 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
[Vol. 18
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
tax was apportioned fairly on the basis of the commerce carried on in
each state.
The same doctrine has also been applied by the Supreme Court to
vessels engaged in water transportation in the case of Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co.5" In that case the taxpayer operated a barge line
on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, picking up and delivering freight in
the several states bordering those rivers. Louisiana imposed an ad
valorem tax on the vessels based on the ratio of miles of lines in that
State to the miles of lines in the entire movement. The Supreme Court
held:
1. That interstate commerce can be made to pay its way
by bearing its share of a non-discriminatory tax burden which
each state may choose to impose on the property or activities
within its borders.
2. The validity of such a tax depends on what proportion
of the property may be attributed to each such state, and
whether the tax imposed by each state is in relation to the op-
portunities, benefits or protection afforded by the taxing state;
and if the tax is fairly apportioned to the commerce carried on
in each state, those requirements are satisfied. The decisions
in both the Braniff case and the Mississippi Valley Barge Line
case were written by Justice Douglas, who has led the Court
to its farthest lengths in this series of cases.
It should be noted in this connection that the U. S. Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia has given this doctrine a some-
what narrower construction in its application to the actual instrumen-
talities of interstate transportation. In Smoot Sand & Gravel Corpora-
tion v. District of Columbia," taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, the
owner of tugs, scows and boats, brought them into the District on an
average of once a day on various operations, but used them preponder-
antly outside the District and exclusively in interstate operations. The
District of Columbia sought to levy an ad valorem tax on the vessels at
full value. The Court held three things:
1. That since the vessels were tangible property the rules
and the cases dealing with intangible property used in interstate
commerce had no application. In other words the taxing situs of
intangibles is a different problem from the taxing situs of tangi-
ble property.
2. That the taxing power of the domiciliary state over its
corporate taxpayers is upon a different basis from the taxing
power of any other state. And since the District was not the
domicle of the taxpayer here it could not presume to tax the
whole of tangible property moving as an instrumentality or
vehicle of interstate commerce.
3. That if tangible property is used as a means of inter-
us336 U. S. 169 (1949).
59 174 Fed. 2d 505 (1949).
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state transportation, it cannot be taxed at full value in any one
of the states in question. A property tax on such tangibles must
be apportioned on some fair basis.
It is believed that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the
Smoot Sand & Gravel Company case reflects the present status of the
doctrine as to the taxation of property used as an instrumentality of
interstate transportation, even as that doctrine has been extended by
the Courts to cover air transportation.
